During the Great Recession mass demonstrations indicated weakened political support in Europe. We show that growing dissatisfaction often reflects poor economic conditions and unemployment is particularly important. Using individual level data for 16 Western European countries for 1976-2010, we find that national economic performance matters even beyond personal economic outcomes. Finally, while the effects of growth and unemployment rates are the same across demographic subsets, the effect of inflation is heterogeneous. Well-educated or working individuals put a relatively higher weight on price stability than the less skilled or not working. Our findings reinforce the political importance of employment and growth policies.
Introduction
During the Great Recession of 2007 several European countries experienced a phase of economic hardship unprecedented in recent decades. The economic downturn came with political repercussions: Mass demonstrations took place in many cities as people expressed their dissatisfaction with the economic situation and how it was being dealt with.
1 By late 2011 the ve EU member countries which had been hit the hardest economically, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, had overturned their governments. Political actors as well as observers noted that democratic institutions themselves could suer under adverse economic conditions. In summer 2010, the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, even expressed his fear that democracy might disappear in the most heavily aected Southern European countries; he feared that macroeconomic conditions could worsen to an extent that would be impossible for governments to deal with and would therefore make them susceptible to popular uprisings (Groves, 2010) . In Italy, the political crisis deepened with the national elections held in early 2013 when the Five Star Movement gained 25% of the vote but refused to support the government (Moody, 2013) . Survey data from the Eurobarometer shows indeed that since the phase of economic downturn peoples' attitudes toward their political system have worsened In this paper we show that the economic harshness during the last years can, to a large extent, explain the observed deterioration of political support as measured by the SWD. Combining individual-level survey data on SWD with country-level data on growth, ination, and unemployment from 1976 to 2010 for 16 Western European countries, we nd that the macroeconomy aects individuals' attitudes toward democracy and the eects are non-negligible in size. Using estimates from pre-crisis data, we predict decreases in SWD in the order of 15 to 23 percentage points as a consequence of poor economic conditions during the Great Recession.
These estimates compare well with the decreases of around 20 percentage points measured for Ireland, Greece, and Spain. We also correctly predict Portugal to be an outlier; while the observed decrease was 4 percentage points, we estimate a decrease of close to 5 percentage points in satisfaction scores.
Even though we nd both growth and unemployment rates to be signicant, the latter are quantitatively much more important. When the growth rate decreases by one standard deviation, the SWD is on average 2.5 percentage points lower; a 1 The protests have received large media coverage, e.g., in Donadio & Sayare (2011) and Tremlett & Hooper (2011) .
1 standard deviation increase in unemployment, however, comes about with a decrease of 7 percentage points in SWD. Politicians might therefore want to focus on employment policies to ensure citizens' support because jobless growth appears to be an undesirable policy outcome. Ination, while signicant in analyses using a country panel, does not have a robust eect when we use individual level data. This result, however, hides heterogeneity across subgroups of the population.
Higher educated and working individuals seem to care much more about ination than do the unskilled or unemployed. In contrast, growth and unemployment rates exhibit homogeneous eects on SWD throughout the population, even though the real implications dier across its subgroups. We argue that a pure self-interest explanation of political support will not easily explain this observation. Resorting to individual level data uncovers important drivers of SWD which remain undetected in national-level analyses. In particular, individual unemployment, education, age, and perceived life satisfaction are signicant correlates.
In section 2, we relate our research to the existing literature. In section 3 we summarize our hypotheses (3.1), describe the dataset (3.2), and introduce our empirical model (3.3). We present our results in section 4 and discuss implications with respect to a self-interest explanation of political support and a policy tradeo between ination and unemployment (Phillips curve) in section 5. We present robustness checks in section 6 and conclude in section 7. Appendix C contains additional tables and is available online.
Related literature
According to Easton (1957, p. 391) support is fed into the political system in relation to three objects: the community, the regime, and the government 2 and can derive from satisfaction with its outputs (Easton, 1957) . Research on political support often focuses on government popularity and thus refers to the most specic dimension of political support (see Norris, 1999a , for an introduction). However, during severe economic crises more than the competence of current governments is questioned. We therefore use the variable`satisfaction with democracy' (SWD) as an indicator of a more diuse dimension of political support.
SWD derives from the survey question On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the way democracy works in <country>? and provides an instrumental evaluation of the performance 2 Similarly, Norris (1999b Norris ( , p. 10, 1620 distinguishes ve layers of political support, the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors.
of democracy (Dalton, 1999, p. 58) . However, the dierent dimensions of political support are interdependent and, indeed, SWD is shown to correlate with all three dimensions of Easton's support classication (Clarke et al., 1993) . Linde & Ekman (2003) argue, that 'satisfaction with the way democracy works' is . . . an item that taps the level of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice.
Complementary research using Latin-American data indicates that satisfaction with democracy does indeed measure support for government rather than satisfaction with the idea of democracy (see Graham & Suktahnkar, 2004, p. 372 and Sarseld & Echegaray, 2006) . This seems natural as how the system is working depends on incumbent politicians. In contrast to trust in politicians or government, SWD has the advantage of being less inuenced by personal sympathy for politicians or an ideological attachment to a specic party.
Previous work on satisfaction with democracy typically relies on national level data or covers relatively short time periods (Clarke et al., 1993; Wagner et al., 2009 ).
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Results thereby rely to a large extent on cross-country variation and individual characteristics are ignored. 4 Furthermore, there is hardly any systematic evidence on the role of macroeconomic factors. We are aware of only three studies of SWD employing individual-level data: Halla et al. (2013) investigate the role of environmental policy, Wells & Krieckhaus (2006) the eect of corruption on SWD, and Lühiste (forthcoming) the role of social protection. The latter two studies use only a few points in time and cannot properly take into account changes in national economic conditions over time. 5 Halla et al. (2013) Falk et al. (2011) nd that the regional unemployment rate has a positive and statistically signicant eect on right-wing extremist crimes. Moving to the microlevel, Lubbers et al. (2002) show how support of extreme right-wing parties increases with unemployment for the same set of countries. MacCulloch & Pezzini (2007) 3 The study by Wagner et al. (2009) Earlier research posited a link from macroeconomic performance to political support based on the presumption that voters hold the government responsible for economic events (Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000) . This can be based on self-interest: Economic conditions determine future well-being. Growth increases expected income, ination reduces the real value of wealth and income, and higher unemployment implies higher risk of job or income loss. Therefore, individuals value, e.g., high growth as an indicator of increasing national welfare, and high ination and high unemployment as signs of decreasing welfare. Going beyond the theory of pure self-interest, individuals may also care about the well-being of others. Macroeconomic performance may increase an individual's satisfaction with democracy because it illustrates the democratic system's capacity to provide collective well-being in the future.
7
Based on the preceding argument we expect that, ceteris paribus, an individual's SWD is
• increasing in national growth,
• decreasing in ination and unemployment.
Furthermore, we expect that individual income and employment status have similar eects, i.e., an individual's SWD is 6 Both, Lubbers et al. (2002) and Brückner & Grüner (2010) , use data from the Eurobarometer.
While the latter only rely on a few data points in time, the former use the 7 We are not positing a link between democratic and economic development. Rather, we argue that generally, a better performing system will enjoy greater support. As a matter of fact, in our sample we only look at democratic systems.
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• increasing in individual income,
• lower in case of personal unemployment.
Regarding other individual characteristics, we expect that an individual's SWD is higher if he or she is better educated, younger, or male as documented in Bäck & Kestilä (2009) .
Empirically, we nd a strong positive correlation between general life satisfaction and SWD. 8 Part of the reason for this correlation could be individual dierences in interpreting satisfaction questions which we would ideally control for with individuallevel xed eects. This is infeasible because the data is a repeated cross-section.
However, by controlling for individual life satisfaction we can control for part of these individual dierences. Moreover, since existing studies show that life satisfaction reacts to macroeconomic variables (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2003) , not including it as an explanatory variable induces an omitted variable bias into the estimation.
Data
Our data set combines survey data with national macroeconomic data for 16 countries and up to 33 years. Specically, it covers France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany (19762010, since 1991 including East Germany), Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece (19812010) , Spain and Portugal (1985 2010), Norway (19901995), Finland (19932010) , Sweden and Austria (19952010) .
We obtain individual level data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 19702002 (European Commission, Brussels, 2008) and nine additional Eurobarometer waves that extend the dataset until 2010 (European Commission, Brussels, 2002 , 2004a ,b, 2006 , 2010 . The Eurobarometer survey covers about 1,000 respondents per country per wave in a repeated cross-section. The indicator SWD is based on the survey question: On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the way democracy works in <country>?
9 which was asked every year from 1976 to 2010 except for 1996 and 2008. Figure 1 illustrates that SWD varies over time.
GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, ination rates, and unemployment rates stem from the OECD Economic Outlook, growth projections from the database OECD.StatExtracts. For robustness checks we used information on national budget 8 Because of the empirically strong correlation, SWD could have similar determinants as has life satisfaction (see for instance Frey & Stutzer, 2002a) . Bäck & Kestilä (2009) nd that indeed the eects for age and education go in the same direction. However, a gender eect appears with the opposite sign: females have a lower SWD (Bäck & Kestilä, 2009). 9 <country> is replaced by the name of the country in which the respondent was interviewed. 
Model setup and specication
We estimate a linear probability model using the following equation:
where observations are indexed by i for individuals, by c for the country in which the individual participated in the survey, and by t for the year of the survey. SWD is a dummy derived from the question how satised an individual is with the way democracy works in his or her country. It collapses answers`very satised' and fairly satised' into`satised' (SWD=1) and answers`not very satised' and`not at all satised' into`not satised' (SWD=0). 
Macroeconomic variables
Our main interest lies in growth, ination, and unemployment, which vary substantially over time, which are responsive to economic policy in the short to medium run, and are likely to be targeted by policy makers. Moreover, these variables have been proven to be inuential in previous studies on SWD (Wagner et al., 2009 ) and right-wing extremism (Knigge, 1998; Brückner & Grüner, 2010) . Since a large literature on the relationship between democracy and economy focuses on GDP (e.g., Przeworski, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2008) , we control for the GDP per head. 10 The following results are summarized in Column 3 is our main specication and is used as a benchmark for our robustness checks. In (4) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. In (5) we restrict attention to the subsample were life satisfaction is available. (6) 
Individual characteristics
It is evident that the respondents' views on the democratic system were not only aected by the national labor market but in addition by the individual situation.
Individual unemployment, education, and age are signicant and the coecients have the expected signs. An unemployed respondent was 4.8 percentage points less likely to be satised with democracy than an employed one (table 1, column 3).
Education was included in dummy categories. The results indicate that those with higher education (nished school at the age of 20 or later) and those still studying evaluated democracy more favorably than those with only basic or no full-time education at all. The inuence of age is U-shaped. Relatively young age individuals become, on average, less satised as they get older, but as they get old enough the democracy whereas growth has but that growth improves the chances of both democracy and autocracy surviving. Thus, growth seems to improve political support in both democracies and non-democracies. The study does not include unemployment rates. Using data from 14 transition countries for the period 19912004, Golinelli & Rovelli (2013) nd that citizens are more likely to support reforms if growth is higher and unemployment lower. The insignicance of GDP per capita for democratic development had previously been shown also by Acemoglu et al. (2008) .
12 The standard deviation of growth is 2.54 in our sample and that of the unemployment rate is 3.99.
13 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that the result might hide a threshold eect.
More generally, if the true eect of growth is nonlinear, the linear model would not be a correct representation of the marginal eect of growth.
9 relationship reverses. The estimates from Column 3, Table 1 imply that around the age of 45 individuals start to become more satised with democracy.
As in Bäck & Kestilä (2009) , the male dummy obtained a signicant, positive coecient whereas it is often negative in happiness studies (see e.g., Frey & Stutzer, 2002a) . Economically, however, gender is negligible; being male is associated with not even a one percentage point higher probability of being satised with democracy.
Those who were out of the labor force did not evaluate democracy signicantly dierently than those who were employed. Marital status did not reach signicance either.
Life satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with SWD. This indicates a close link between the perceived personal situation and the view on the democratic system.
Those who were not at all satised with their lives were much less likely to state that they were satised with the way democracy worked (-34 percentage points)
than those who were fairly satised with their lives (omitted category). Those who stated being not very satised with their life in general were much less likely to be satised with democracy (-25 percentage points) and those who were very satised with their life were in contrast more likely to be also satised with democracy (+7 percentage points).
Life satisfaction as well as SWD are subjective measures and we are aware of concerns regarding the use of subjective variables as dependent and explanatory at the same time (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001) . However, many studies indicate that macroeconomic variables also aect individual life satisfaction and happiness (see e.g., Di Tella et al., 2001 Tella et al., , 2003 Deaton, 2008; Dreher & Öhler, 2011) . Ignoring this will likely introduce a bias into the results, in particular, since life satisfaction is also known to be correlated with other individual characteristics (see for instance Frey & Stutzer, 2002b) . In our case, quantitative ndings from the specication with life satisfaction are more conservative than they are without it. Comparing column 3
(with life satisfaction) with columns 4 and 5 (without) in people have a slightly higher probability of being satised with democracy compared to middle income earners. There is no signicant eect of low income. The results regarding other individual characteristics remain unaected beyond a selection effect that is driven by the availability of the income measure as can be seen from columns 6 (subsample for which income is available, not controlling for income) and 7 (controlling for income) in table 1.
With respect to individual characteristics our results are very similar to Halla et al. (2013) , qualitatively. The signs of all coecients are the same with one exception:
In contrast to Halla et al. (2013) we do not nd a signicantly positive eect of being married on SWD. This dierence is most likely due to the omission of life satisfaction in their study (see table 1 ). As discussed above, life satisfaction should be included in analyses of SWD because an omitted variable bias is likely to occur otherwise (see also section 3.1).
5. Discussion
Economic relevance: satisfaction scores during the Great Recession
Our results suggest that, on average, satisfaction with democracy should have decreased by non-negligible numbers during the Great Recession. We estimated our model on pre-crisis data and computed predicted changes in satisfaction with democracy due to worsening economic conditions. Using data until 2006, we estimate the coecients to be signicant at 0.0089 for growth (standard error: 0.003) and at By analyzing subpopulations, we show that the eects we nd are unlikely to be explained by simple self-interest alone. We focus on subsamples which dier with respect to education and labor market status so that the labor market chances of the resulting groups are objectively dierent (tables 2 and 3). Surprisingly, the eects of growth and unemployment rates are signicant for all groups and not signicantly dierent in size across groups (see table 2 ). Unemployed versus employed, low-skilled versus high-skilled, and those in or out of the labor force are dierently exposed to labor market conditions such that we would have expected heterogeneous eects according to the self-interest model. Not nding such dierences suggests other factors are at work.
One explanation is collectivist welfare concerns. Individuals may believe democracy to be the system that is best able to provide collective welfare. Growth and low unemployment are success indicators of this system's performance and make individuals be satised with democracy even when it does not directly maximize their expected personal income since their`true preference' implies a concern for collective welfare (see Sen, 1977 , for a similar argument). Another explanation is that individuals take general equilibrium eects and their consequences at the individual level into account. For instance, they anticipate cuts in transfers or increases in taxes when the economic situation is worsening. and unemployment which societies may face. We use our estimation results to 17 For the eects to be similar across groups these general eects must outweigh any dierential eect stemming from, e.g., individual labor market prospects. The test against full sample compares coecients from an estimation on the subsample to those from the benchmark estimation in 14 analyze the relative costs of ination and unemployment in terms of changes in SWD. In our benchmark estimation on the full sample, ination rates did not gain signicance, preventing this type of analysis. In the analysis of subgroups, however, ination turned signicant for parts of the population (table 3) .
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According to the results for subgroups of the population, the trade-o between ination and unemployment in terms of satisfaction scores varies within the population.
Ination rates exhibit a signicantly negative eect on the higher skilled individuals (table 3, column 1). In the analysis using the full sample, this was blurred by ination not aecting low-skilled individuals (see tables 1 and 2). For individuals with higher education, an increase by 1.39 percentage points in ination is associated with the same satisfaction cost as a 1% point increase in unemployment (table   3 , column 1). 19 For those with low education, ination is insignicant, as discussed before. If the eect was signicant at the reported size, an increase by 3.79 percentage points in ination would be associated with the same satisfaction cost as a 1
percentage point increase in unemployment.
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The eect of ination is also heterogeneous with respect to labor force status, as shown by the positively signicant interaction terms between ination and unemployed, and out of LF, respectively. However, the eect is not signicant within either of those subgroups (table 2) . When we restrict attention to individuals in the labor force (table 3, column 2), we nd that the unemployed attach a much higher weight to unemployment rates relative to ination as do the employed. The same applies to those out of the labor force as compared to those who are part of the labor force (table 3, column 3). Column 4 of table 3 combines these two splits and shows that the unemployed as well as those out of the labor force attach a relatively higher weight to unemployment rates than those who are part of the labor force and have a job. 21 The estimates from column 4 imply that the employed would be willing to 18 If we look at the subsample where information on income is available, ination is signicant.
Using estimates from table 1, column 7, the loss in satisfaction with democracy from a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment equals the eect from an increase in ination by 20 Under the assumption that the estimated eect holds for any value of ination, the insignicance of ination would imply that those with low education prefer an arbitrarily large increase in ination to prevent unemployment from rising. This is implausible.
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The measure of out of labor force in our dataset includes retirees as well and thus might pick up the eect of old age. Column 5 shows that the interaction of out of labor force with ination is not only driven by the elderly; the interaction eect remains signicant when we restrict the sample to individuals of age 60 or younger. When we aggregate our results to the full population, however, we obtain a higher marginal rate of substitution indicating that for satisfaction with democracy in our sample ination is less important than for life satisfaction in Di Tella et al. (2001) (see appendix A).
Aggregate level regressions
Even though satisfaction with democracy is determined at the individual level, previous studies on SWD have concentrated on country averages. They collapse either the ordered data to an average or a binary recode to a percentage measure of support; changes in these national averages can come by various channels hidden in the aggregates. When we use the year-wise country average of SWD as the dependent variable and estimate a linear probability model, the results are broadly consistent with studies by other authors: growth is signicantly positive, unemployment and ination are signicantly negative (compare for instance Clarke et al., 1993; Wagner et al., 2009 ).
Comparing the results in table 4 with those from individual level data (table   1) , however, we observe qualitative dierences as GDP/head and ination become signicant. The coecients of growth and unemployment using country-level data have the same sign and are also of similar size as those in the individual-level data.
When we include the average score of life satisfaction (column 5), its eect is positive and highly signicant as in the individual-level analysis. Moreover, all coecients become smaller (in absolute terms) if life satisfaction is controlled for. We further show that our ndings are robust with respect to including growth lags, leads or forecasts and with respect to using non-linear models. Moreover, we illustrate that our results are not driven by omitting indicators of institutional quality or economic policy.
Lagged growth, growth expectations, and endogeneity
Growth rates from previous periods may be inuential in addition to contemporaneous growth rates because real eects need time to materialize. Thus, we tested whether lagged growth has an impact on SWD. Column 2 in table C.9 shows that lagged growth does not have a signicant inuence on SWD and including it in the regression hardly aects the coecients of the other macroeconomic variables as compared to the main model in column 1.
One might object to the results from section 4 and table 1 that it is not growth that has an inuence on SWD but rather higher satisfaction levels which lead to better economic performance. Robustness checks indicate that our results are not an artifact of endogenous growth rates. First, we included future growth rates (column 3 of table C.5). Future growth obtains a coecient even larger in size than the coecient of contemporaneous growth. This might be due to reverse causality, i.e., satisfaction with democracy driving growth rates, but could also be caused by the serial correlation of growth rates. In both cases, however, this is not the entire story since contemporaneous growth and unemployment are still signicant. The eect which remains when we include future growth can be considered a lower bound on the eect of growth on SWD. Second, we also included the average lagged satisfaction with democracy at the country level (column 4). By doing so, we control for the link potentially running from SWD to growth in the next period. Furthermore, we control for correlation between SWD today and growth tomorrow by including future growth rates. Thus, the coecient of growth in column 4 reects only the contemporaneous correlation between SWD and growth. This is more likely to be an eect from growth on SWD than an eect from contemporaneous SWD on contemporaneous growth. The eect of growth is still about 75% as large as in the main analysis and signicant. Since satisfaction with democracy on average does not change very fast, this absorbs a large part of the variation and might make inference less reliable.
A third explanation for why future growth is signicant is that it proxies for growth expectations. Growth expectations in turn are likely to have a positive eect on satisfaction scores. We nd that indeed growth forecasts, which are conceptionally closer to growth expectations than are growth leads, are highly statistically signicant (column 4). Moreover, ination becomes signicant. But, even though expectations seem to be important, so too is the current situation, as the contemporaneous growth rate remains signicant.
Logit and ordered logit
In the preceding analysis, we have estimated a linear probability model with a binary recode of SWD as the dependent variable. The advantages in terms of interpretation and simplicity of the linear model seem to outweigh potential gains from a nonlinear model (for a discussion see also Angrist & Pischke, 2009) . Results from a logit model that explicitly takes the domain restriction of the dependent variable into account are qualitatively the same and quantitatively close to those from the linear probability model. All marginal eects lie above the coecients from the linear model so that our results are rather conservative. For details see tables C.6 and C.7.
We also analyzed determinants of SWD using the original, ordered outcome which may contain more information but is supposedly more noisy (Veenhoven, 1996) .
All variables which obtained signicance in the main analysis are signicant in the ordered logit with the same sign. In addition and in line with results from an ordered logit model in Halla et al. (2013) , ination becomes marginally signicant. 22 The marginal eects are consistent with the view that the results in the binary recode are driven by individuals switching from being not satised to being satised with the way democracy works and vice versa. For details see table C.8.
Institutional quality
Our analysis assumes that democratic institutions in Western Europe did not change over the relevant time horizon. This is not restrictive for several reasons. First, the binary Democracy-Dictatorship measure (Cheibub et al., 2009 ) is constant for all country-year pairs in our sample and indicates stable democracies. Consequently, our results would remain the same if we controlled for institutional quality in this sense. Second, controlling for either the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2011) 
Policy measures
Obviously, it could be that not the macroeconomic outcomes inuence citizens' satisfaction but instead policies implemented by their governments (see e.g., Lühiste
(forthcoming) on the role of social protection for SWD). We therefore test for the eects of debt and decit levels and also include two measures which proxy for social spending, (1) 
Conclusion
The European debt crisis has had a severe impact on European democracies. In the ve most heavily aected EU member countries, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, governments have been voted out of oce. But the demands by the various protestors went beyond the deselection of governments and people's perception of the democratic system have changed in the course of the crisis, not only in Greece and Italy but also in many other European countries.
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This paper shows that the changing attitudes toward democracy were to be expected as a consequence of extremely poor national economic performance. Lower growth rates and higher unemployment rates were both associated with fewer respondents stating they were satised with the way democracy works in a representative 
B. A closer look at ination
In contrast to Halla et al. (2013) who report a signicant eect of ination on SWD,
we do not nd a robust eect of ination on SWD. 25 This dierence does not seem to stem from our using of a binary recode of SWD instead of the original four-point scale of SWD. If we estimate an ordered logit model, ination is signicant only in a model with unemployment rates. If we omit unemployment rates to be closer to Halla et al. (2013) , ination returns to being insignicant.
Our data extends until 2010 and thereby covers the crisis years with extremely low ination or even deation that are not included in previous studies. If we exclude the crisis-years since 2007, ination still does not reach signicance (see section 5.1). Moreover, if we allow for non-linear eects of ination or a dierential eect of deation, we only conrm our results that ination does not play a major role for the population on average. (2011) growth forecast Growth forecasts were calculated using projections of GDP con- (3) is the reference for robustness checks. In (4) we restrict attention to the subsample where life satisfaction is available but do not include it. In (5) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. (6) is estimated on the reduced sample where income is available, (7) controls for income groups. In (2) we restrict attention to the subsample where life satisfaction is available. In (3) we exclude life satisfaction from the estimation. Column 1 is the benchmark estimation from table 1, column 3. (2) is estimated on the reduced sample for which the polity IV index is equal to its highest value 10. (3) controls for the polity4 score. (4) and (5) 
